Introduction
To ask why there was no controversy over Life -that is, debates specifically focusing on the status of living beings, their mode of functioning, their internal mechanisms and above all their ‗uniqueness' within the physical universe as a whole -in the Scientific Revolution is to simultaneously run the risk of extreme narrowness of detail and/or of excessive breadth in scope. That is, if we take the question ‗why?' at face value, a succinct answer can be given right away: the Scientific Revolution is an intellectual construct that we owe chiefly to Alexandre Koyré and Herbert Butterfield, and it was entirely focused on the physico-mechanical sciences; the latter focus was never modified by one iota in the successive historiographic reassessments of this episode which emphasized notably its Puritan, gentlemanly or courtly roots, 1 and said not a word about the life sciences. 2 Hence our concept of the Scientific Revolution does not include debates over generation, semina rerum, species, anatomy, vivisection, animal souls, irritability and so forth. 3 Conversely, the title question appears enormous and unmanageable once we realize that it implies many other questions:
(i) if Life was not a topic of controversy in and for the Scientific Revolution, when did it become one?
This question requires that we decide what counts as a controversy; for surely debates between
Harvey and Riolan on the heart, or Whytt and Haller on irritability, do not meet the criteria for a ‗strong' definition of a controversy in the history of science, i.e., in Helga Nowotny's definition, as -part of the collective production of knowledge … the very lifeblood of science, one of the most productive factors in scientific development‖ (Mendelsohn 1987: 93 , see also Dascal 1998) .
(ii) How should we then understand the various activities that existed at the time, from anatomy and physiology (or the study of the ‗animal economy') to medicine overall, as well as natural history, botany, chemistry? 4 Notice that even when we discard monolithic concepts of the Scientific Revolution and adopt a much more nuanced approach to the disciplinary status and diversity of natural philosophy, as Domenico Bertoloni Meli does in an exemplary recent article, emphasizing the interplay between the mathematical and medical disciplines, so that -when unraveling the intellectual world in the seventeenth-century, we can no longer separate the history of anatomy from the history of science as if anatomists and physicians inhabited a different world from not only mechanical and experimental philosophers, but also mathematicians,‖ 5 this still does not help us answer question (ii) above. We could extend the narrative of the Scientific Revolution to include debates on the circulation of blood, or the usefulness of the microscope (say, Borelli versus Locke), or the epistemological status of the ‗animal economy' in relation to machine as well as soul. 6 Alternatively, we could be more faithful to the actual contents of the reports presented to the Royal Society or the Académie des sciences in their first fifty years of existence, which turn out to be much more biologically oriented than traditional historiography had led us to believe. 7 But in either case, these extensions would miss the dimension of ‗crisis', that is, the sense that the existence of living beings suddenly again becomes an explanatory challenge or even a -scandal,‖ whether from the standpoint of physics or on the contrary from the standpoint of the autonomy of biology. 8 In addition, our title question also implies a historiographic claim about the Enlightenment, which follows from (i):
(iii) Life is a controversial topic for the eighteenth century, not the seventeenth (regardless of the varied and significant contributions of Sanctorius, Harvey, Glisson, Malpighi, Baglivi, Descartes, Guillaume Lamy, Swammerdam, Van Helmont and others).
This incidentally seems to reverse Foucault's claim in The Order of Things that ‗Life' did not exist before the emergence of biology as a science bearing that name, in the nineteenth century, 9 as well as the much more common claim, found typically in histories of physiology and related textbooks, that the ‗modern', functionally specified concept of man as machine successfully banished concepts such as ‗Life' from science, especially once the ‗machine' is augmented with Darwinian evolution and the modern synthesis. 10 The irony here is that it is precisely after Cartesian or LaMettrian concepts of bêtes-machines or hommes-machines that Life becomes a locus of a kind of ontological crisis, either because natural philosophers worry about what it is, what its minimal conditions and components are, or because they worry about the boundaries between dead matter and living matter -such as when Buffon, in his comparison of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, ponders the exact nature of -le vivant et l'animé‖: whether Life is a metaphysical property of certain entities (-un degré métaphysique des êtres‖) or a -physical property of matter‖; he ultimately opts for a kind of ‗panspermist' hypothesis in which life is always potentially present in matter, notably in the form of organic molecules, so that -raw matter‖ merely means -dead matter.‖ 11 Similarly, Gabriel-François Venel, in his long entry -Chymie‖ for the Encyclopédie, states that organic molecules and organized bodies are subject to laws that are different from (-essentiellement diverses de‖) the laws of matter in motion; as sources, he refers both to Buffon and to the errors of iatromechanist physicians with respect to the functioning of the -animal economy‖ (Venel 1753: 410) .
Lastly, in addition to this revision of the ‗Enlightenment' concept, our question also raises a specific disciplinary issue in close relation to point (ii) above:
(iv) Does this emerging ontological concern about Life reflect the constitution of a science? Is it a precondition for a science? The concern and its various verbal expressions clearly predate the coinage of the word ‗biology' in German and French (and its establishment as a science) by roughly a century (Salomon-Bayet 1981; Caron 1988) .
As I will try to show in closing, the emergence of a ‗field of controversy' concerning the status of Life is hardly synonymous with the constitution of the science called biology. That does not mean it is not productive of forms of knowledge, such as medicine or natural history or in a very different kind of categorization, ‗knowledge of the body' (see Wolfe and Gal (eds), 2010) .
But by the time the name ‗biology' (or its close competitor, ‗zoonomy') comes to the fore as a -synthetic, unitary science of life‖ (Singer 1929 (Singer /1958 in all these competing theories of the human body, notably the very successful mechanistic theories, -Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition provided‖ (Stahl 1706b in Stahl 1859 . To follow Stahl's suggestion, we could say that Life is either discussed but immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which subserve it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, and animation are so coextensive to the field of investigation that Life as problem again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. There is discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization between Life and non-Life (with the notable exception of Stahl in his polemic with Leibniz, which I shall turn to in section 2), nor the possibility of resolution between two positions, which implies some shared conceptual framework (Freudenthal 1998 call final cause -is nothing but a human appetite‖ -the causes of which we tend to be unaware of (Spinoza 1675 (Spinoza /2002 One can see why Stahl protested that Life had vanished from the bio-medical purview! Indeed, in a kind of unconscious echo of Stahl's concerns, Boerhaave declared in a much-cited lecture on the -use of mechanical methods in medicine‖ that -the human body is in its nature the same as the whole of the Universe‖ (Boerhaave 1703 (Boerhaave /1983 , which I take less as a
Renaissance-type statement of correspondences and more in the sense of a broadly mechanistic commitment to an ontology in which material particles and their interaction exhaustively account for the physical universe including ourselves.
In fact, these apparently pure statements of iatromechanism mask a more complex (and concrete) reality on the ground, where functional dimensions are never wholly absent from physiological explanations -even Descartes will speak of the -office‖ of the liver (to would be easy to dismiss this as a kind of substance metaphysics, as indeed Albrecht von
Haller did when he both credited Glisson with the discovery of the property of muscular irritability and excluded him from the history of science proper (Giglioni 2008) ; but clearly
Glisson reflects on the nature of our organic structure (organizatio, § 11), its relation to our sense organs, and how animal spirits are not a sufficient explanation of the features of ‗animation' and complex perception which our sense organs display.
However, it remains a challenge to integrate this aspect of Glisson into a Scientific
Revolution narrative, since it is rather a species of matter theory; what is more, this very immanentism means that the nature of Life does not arise as a topic for controversy for Glisson. A converse attempt has been made recently by Guido Giglioni to present the existence of a ‗vitalistic' strain no longer in a marginal but in a central figure, Bacon, focusing on the theme of the ‗appetites of matter' and the related fixation on the -prolongation of life‖ (Giglioni 2010 (Giglioni , 2005 . But on the issue of the demarcation of ‗Life' as an object (a) that requires a specific science or group of sciences and (b) which existing sciences do not adequately treat, it seems more relevant that when Bacon is outlining the contents of the Sylva sylvarum (published posthumously in 1626), he presents thirteen works as -physiological remains‖ (Bacon 1854, - Table of Contents‖) ; out of these, seven concern minerals and six concern attractive force and the transformations of inanimate bodies (even if Bacon discusses these in biological terms). Thus Bacon does not attend to, or is not concerned with, a distinction between the living and the non-living.
Mechanism, corpuscularianism, Baconian natural philosophy (to which one could add Locke's Helmontian medical reflections but also his philosophical consideration of the ‗life' that is the unity and identity of a plant, animal or a man 16 ) do not address the question of Life; they do not see it as a problem, or a fortiori an ontological crisis. If it is historically insensitive to completely leave out the life sciences from all accounts of the Scientific Revolution, as so many do, it is also mistaken to completely gloss over the problem, either in strong terms, such as when Harvey is simply described as a bona fide member of the intellectual construct called ‗Scientific Revolution' (-Harvey … tended to stress the importance of observation and experiment, an increased emphasis on which was a vital part of that change in outlook which is sometimes called the Scientific Revolution‖ 17 ), or in weaker terms, such as Peter Dear's more recent statement that there is -no reason in principle‖ to -ignore the sciences of life,‖ since ‗physics' in the early modern period is conceived as inquiry into nature in general (Dear 1998: 190) . Something is missing from this picture. Some scholars, particularly in the humanities,
would say that what is missing is the body -and an entire sub-discipline of cultural history has devoted itself over the past twenty-plus years to studying the historical constitution of the body, with particular attention given to its Renaissance and early modern formations. 18 But precisely, what differentiates a living body from a corpse -a leitmotiv in the concern with Life -is heavily determined by the involvement with chemistry. It is to this, via Leibniz, that I now turn.
Machines of nature, ferments and chemical metaphysics
Mechanistic approaches to Life should not be caricatured as they sometimes are, e.g. by Richard Westfall, who described medical mechanism as -the puppet regime set up by the mechanical philosophy's invasion‖ (Westfall 1971: 104) . Whether in its earliest phases ormost evidently -in its late and complexified form such as Albrecht von Haller's ‗micro-mechanical' analysis of physiological structure, combining structural and functional explanations, these approaches are not blind to the nature of vital processes, but seek to heuristically model them, e.g. by the usage of automata, which Borelli cleverly described as having -a certain shadowy sameness (umbratilem similitudinem) to animals‖ (Borelli 1680: II, viii) .
And yet something has changed by the time of Buffon and Diderot in the late 1740s.
‗Life', ‗organized bodies' (corps organisés, organisierte Körper) and gradually ‗organisms' are everywhere. The Encyclopédie discusses matters pertaining to biological Life far more,
proportionately, than its predecessor and inspiration of fifty years earlier, Chambers' Cyclopedia.
Conversely, the Encyclopédie has no article on Galileo (whereas Galileo features prominently, e.g. in Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae, which is a major source of the Encyclopédie; SalomonBayet 1978: 384). In § 4 of his 1753 Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature, Diderot gave an exhortatory dimension to this state of affairs, and declared that
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines and the D'Alemberts will have left it. . . . We will not go beyond (Diderot 1994: 561 (Leibniz 1978, IV: 482) ; they are machines to infinity also in the sense that bodies contain seeds which can never be destroyed (ibid., 475). He also specifies that it is living bodies which are machines of nature (Monadology, § 64 and for a full discussion of this notion in Leibniz, Fichant 2003) . This is where the terminology of ‗organism' starts to appear: -The organism of a living being (organismus viventium) is nothing other than a divine mechanism which is more subtle than an ordinary mechanism in the infinity of its subtlety‖ (Leibniz 1961: 16, § 13; Leibniz 1978, I: 15) . Due to the law of the conservation of force among other reasons, Leibniz refuses to allow for any type of extracausal influence on bodies of a vital principle that would be separate from bodies as a whole. But let us return to the discussion with Stahl, since it is essentially here that Leibniz develops a concept of organism, because Stahl, in a combination of medico-physiological and chemical reflection, insists repeatedly on Life. To put it differently, the recognition of ‗Life' as a problem (which goes hand in hand with the formulation of ‗organism' as a concept) is an effect of Leibniz's debate with Stahl, since their disagreement specifically centres on Stahl's assertion that the organism obeys causal laws which are different from those operating in mechanical nature overall, an assertion Leibniz cannot accept although he too wishes to defend a concept of organism (Duchesneau 1995 , Carvallo 2010 Stahl, too, viewed the body as composed of organic matter in a process of fermentation, which in fact meant it was vulnerable to putrefaction -indeed, always in a process of putrefaction in some sense. Some parts of the body are more vulnerable than others, notably the blood; hence Stahl describes circulation as a process which preserves the mixtio of the blood and thereby maintains the stability of the whole. This is a good example of how his system renders the chemical and the metaphysical almost indissociable, in his description of the living body as a kind of dynamic equilibrium which constantly has to be maintained. On the one hand this equilibrium is chemically specified, both at the level of the sometimes revised so that -organs are not, as the name might suggest, mere instruments,‖ but nevertheless, -it is the soul that makes the lungs breathe, the heart beat, the blood circulate, the stomach digest, the liver secrete‖ (Stahl 1706a , § xcviii, in Stahl 1859 . Put these two together and you have the notion of a -highly fermentable organic body [which] has to rely on a vigilant anima to discharge the corrupt and harmful materials from the vital economy in a timely manner.‖ (originally published 1763), explains that the faculties of the body are equivalent to the properties of matter in general (e.g. gravity, elasticity and attraction), but that within the organism these produce processes of fermentation and putrefaction which seem to be restricted to living beings (Sauvages 1763 (Sauvages /1771 .
Of course, the mechanical explanations of digestion are augmented with processes such as heat, vibration, the action of the spirits, and continuous compression, recalling our earlier point that it is not always appropriate to fully distinguish the ‗mechanical' and the ‗purposive' or the ‗functional', in seventeenth-or eighteenth-century physiology and natural philosophy. Sauvages believed that the fully self-contained nature of his calculations on the body's energy proved the existence of an independent soul which was the source of this motion, and -surprisingly, we would think, for an ‗animist' -praised the discoveries of Baglivi, Pitcairne, Newton and Boerhaave precisely for their calculations as applied to the body (Sauvages 1731: 2) . As Roger French comments, -it is something of an ‗ism' paradox that the eighteenth-century ‗mechanists' generally described the body in non-quantitative terms whereas the ‗animists' used mathematics to demonstrate the need of a soul to power the machine of the body‖ (French 1990: 103) . A missing term in this opposition between mechanism and animism is vitalism.
Organisms, ferments and digestive systems all have some more or less obvious, more or less intuitive relation to an idea we might call ‗Life', and indeed gradually, from the iatrochemists to Stahl, and onwards to his disciples in the mid-eighteenth century and their
Auseinandersetzungen with the group of physicians who come to be called vitalists by the dawn of the next century, 31 these kinds of phenomena, together with more broad research programmes such as physiology (as opposed to anatomy), are being presented as specifically vital. Venel, in the article -Chimie‖ in the Encyclopédie, speaks of -changes‖ which bodies undergo, such that they -move from the non-organic state to the organic state,‖ and suggests that the -phenomena of organisation [i.e. organism, organic phenomena, CW] should be treated by a science separate from all other parts of Physic‖ (Venel 1753: 410) . Where is the crisis, then? What happened to the ontological controversy? Remember that Stahl had spoken in fairly strong terms, if not of scandal then at least of shock: -What shocked me above all was that in this physical theory of the human body, Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition provided‖ (Stahl 1706 , in Stahl 1859 rhetorically by Peter Hans Reill: -if mechanism could, e.g., explain the pumping action of the heart, it was incapable of saying why the heart continually kept pumping without running down‖ (Reill 2005: 135) . Obviously, for Stahl a major part of the answer lay in the soul, and specifically its purposive, goal-directed action -a view which earned him the ridicule of many prominent scientists, such as Haller, who suggested that Stahlians (who rejected interventionist medicine in the face of disease) were to mechanist physicians like a half-naked ancient German warrior was, compared with an armed Roman centurion, in uniform. 33 One can also try and reconstruct Stahl's often unnecessarily obscure argumentation in a charitable way, and point out that he never denies the basic laws of physics and chemistry, nor the fact that living bodies, too, obey the laws of motion. As we saw with fermentation, the idea is rather to articulate a kind of ‗emergentist' view in the weak sense that certain arrangements of particles exhibit complex, goal-directed behavior. 34 However, Stahl is quite adamant that the above be attributed to the soul -which then controls the various mechanically specifiable parts of the body as so many instruments. Stahl is a teleologist, who definitely believes that -The question, ‗What is life?' lay behind everything I learned. Life seemed to be characterized by a peculiar reasonableness and purposefulness of instinctive involuntary action‖ -even if these words belong to another German, in the midtwentieth century: Wilhelm Reich (Reich 1968: 45) . But all of the new chemical concepts he both appropriates and innovates with, allow of both an anti-reductionist interpretation (his own), and a reductionist interpretation -which is not specifically mechanistic, as we shall see -with materialists such as Buffon and Diderot. And in this reductionist approach, the vital dimension is not discarded.
Constitutive materialist ontology of Life or gradual constitution of biology?
Neither biology nor chemistry exist as stable theoretical entities in the early modern or Enlightenment periods, even if chemistry had existed for a long time, but on unstable methodological and conceptual bases. Yet the constitution of an autonomous ontological region corresponding to ‗the science of living beings', i.e. biology, is significantly affected by chemistry, as we have seen. One way to describe this is to say that chemistry is, at least at this time, the science which -allows for an understanding of matter as something that -at least provisionally -cannot be reduced to calculation‖ (Starobinski 1999: 86) . Recall Buffon and
Diderot's anti-mathematical proclamations of a new science of Life (-natural history,‖ but also the study of the -animal economy‖ in medicine), or the prominence of vital matters in the Encyclopédie.
Iatrochemical, Stahlian concepts that merge the chemical and the metaphysical are turned into reductive materialist concepts by Diderot (reductive notably in the sense that they are meant to replace explanations that appeal, e.g. to the soul), yet these concepts are not themselves meant to be mechanically or ultimately, mathematically specifiable. This takes several interrelated forms: Diderot's enriched atomism of vital minima, in which the ‗atoms' or ‗molecules' of living matter are themselves alive; his transformation of Hallerian irritability via
Bordeu's concept of sensitivity (sensibilité) into a concept of organic sensitivity which is itself a property of living matter. The difference between irritability and sensitivity in Haller is that the former is fully mechanically specifiable and is strictly a property of muscle fibres, while the latter has a functional component as it is directed towards the organism's survival, and it presupposes the existence of the ‗soul'.
In Diderot, this difference is collapsed into one property of living matter, with some waverings as to whether this property occurs in the elements or only in organized wholes, but he seems to opt ultimately for the latter. Sensitivity and therefore Life require, according to Diderot, the presence of organic -continuity‖ rather than mere spatial -contiguity‖ (Diderot's terms, which map onto Stahl's distinction between aggregate and mixt; Diderot 1994 : 625-628, Boury 2006 , Wolfe 2006 . The difference between the life of an organic being and the life of a wooden automaton, or a watch, is not that the former possesses a soul, or is free, whereas the latter is not. The difference is, one might say, a structural one, between two different types of arrangements of parts. This is what Leibniz, a favorite author of Diderot's, meant when he declared that -a feeling or sensing being is not something mechanical like a watch or a windmill‖ (Preface to the New Essays, in Leibniz 1978, vol. 5: 59) or, in Diderot's version, which reflects his annoyance with the prevalent clock metaphor: -What a difference there is, between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!‖ (Elements of Physiology, in Diderot 1994 : 1283 .
It is for this reason that the concept of ‗mechanistic materialism' is so problematic, and perhaps downright false (Kaitaro 1987) : because most materialists, unlike Descartes, do not claim that physical nature is essentially specifiable in mechanistic terms. Diderot's challenge is to be able to do justice to the difference between organic and inorganic beings, without having reference to a concept of ‗soul', anima, as the basis of animation -given that the distinction between ‗animate' and ‗inanimate' initially means ‗possessed-of-soul' versus ‗not-possessed-of soul' (Cunningham 2003: 58) . This will be the concept of active, sensing matter. Hence his materialism is significantly focused on the concept of Life. It is in this sense that his -revolutionary‖ fervor (of -We are at the dawn of a revolution‖) is not just a way of participating in the emergence of biology as a science, since it is also a philosophical project.
Consider the article -Spinosiste‖ of the Encyclopédie, by Diderot:
SPINOSIST: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not confuse the ancient Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The general principle of the latter is that matter is sensitive; they demonstrate this by the development of the egg, an inert body which by the sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to the state of a sensing, living being, and by the growth of any animal which in its inception [principe] is merely a point, and through the nutritive assimilation of plants and -in one word -of all substances that serve the purpose of nutrition, becomes a great sensing and living body in a greater [expanse of] space. From this they conclude that only matter exists, and that it is sufficient to explain everything. For the rest, they follow ancient Spinosism in all of its consequences (Encyclopédie XV: 474 / Diderot 1994: 484) .
No one has ever produced a satisfactory explanation as to why Diderot chooses to place an affirmation of his biologically motivated metaphysics within an entry on a philosopher ( founded on the life sciences rather than on a priori metaphysical speculation (Vernière 1954 (Vernière /1982 ; what -neo-Spinozism‖ -which he attributes not just to Diderot but to Maupertuisdoes is -refashion a monism more in accordance with the findings of science‖ (533). In the present context I will content myself with the observation that the difference between -ancient Spinosists‖ and -modern Spinosists‖ effectively maps onto the historical narrative I have been suggesting: whereas ancient Spinosists are essentially substance metaphysicians, their modern descendents are essentially focused on Life, specifically, the radical implications of the biological theory of epigenesis.
Harvey, who is supposed to have coined the term, defines epigenesis as -the superaddition of parts… out of the power or potentiality of the pre-existent matter‖ (Harvey 1653: 223) . More specifically, epigenesis is the theory of generation (or development as we would now call it) in which the characteristics and structure of the mature organism may be predetermined in the embryo, but are not -pre-imprinted‖ in it. Rather, they are acquired during the course of a gradual development, in which the embryo undergoes transformations under the influence of the environment. In this sense, it is opposed to the preformationist theory, according to which all the characteristics of the developed organism correspond directly to characteristics -imprinted‖ in the embryo. (Diderot 1994: 618) .
Aside from its stated radical dimension (to overthrow all schools of theology), there is also clearly something ‗vital' about the commitment to epigenesis, or even vitalistic, as Hans (protoplasm) and ultimately arriving, by the mid-nineteenth century, at the study of development, focusing on structure and function (morphology and anatomy versus physiology); at this point biology also requires cell theory in order to explain cellular division and conjugation, and has to incorporate evolutionary and ecological components (Singer 1929 /1958 , Caron 1988 , Barsanti 2000 . It is no surprise that Cuvier by 1810 can declare that -the anatomical portion of the general problem of life has been resolved for a long time, at least as concerns the animals which interest us the most‖ (Cuvier 1810, II, -Histoire naturelle,‖ 207).
To reiterate the point otherwise, the various instances of an emerging ‗life science' in the eighteenth century -from the renewal of theories of generation to Haller's work on irritability, to pieces of ‗folk biology' such as Trembley's polyp or Bonnet's aphids (Roe 1981, Lenhoff and Lenhoff 1989) are not themselves identical with an ontological concern with the status of Life. To conflate these two would be to create a monolithic concept of vitalism which would somehow lead inexorably to the constitution of biology as a science. As much as (Barthez 1806, vol. 1: 96, n. 17) . It is true that some of these figures viewed these episodes of the coming-to-be of biology as not conforming to the laws of mechanics (or even violating them), and thus placing -in serious difficulty the traditional paradigm, based on the sovereignty of physics‖ (Barsanti 2000: 124 (Toellner 1977) . What it tells us here is not so much a matter for Kuhnian philology as a problem for understanding the development of biology as a discipline and how it relates to the more ontologically oriented discussions of the previous century (from the core years of the Scientific Revolution to the SpätAufklärung).
If Life and the investigation into Life is not then manageable as a Scientific Revolution narrative, we can of course revise the latter to include more discussion of animal spirits, of Newton's queries on sensation and their influence on biomedicine in the next generation, and of course of the shift from a notion of ‗soul' to various embodied, cognitive and even neuropsychological concepts. We can also insist on the presence of quantitative experimentation, notably in the Italian anatomists. But we will not able to reconstruct a controversy over Life within the frame of the development of biology. In the seventeenth century Life is either everywhere, as in Gassendi or Glisson, but it is immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which mechanistically subserve it, or promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, ferments, seeds and other forms of animation are so co-extensive to the field of investigation that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. There is discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization between Life and nonLife. In the eighteenth century, with Stahl and Diderot, Life becomes a ‗crisis' concept -with anti-reductionist and reductionist trajectories, respectively -until by the early nineteenth century it resolves into being a structural concept with no ontological component. This is patently the case in Claude Bernard -a careful reader of Diderot, who left behind an unpublished manuscript on the latter's medical and physiological writings (Barral 1900 ) -for whom vitality is an effect of a particular type of physical organization, and nothing more:
-l'élément ultime du phénomène est physique; l'arrangement est vital.‖ 39 We could conclude, following a hint of François Duchesneau's, that the concept of ‗Life' is an artificial construct, an être de raison created when rationality runs up against the speculative limits of a physiological theory that experience cannot wholly circumscribe (Duchesneau 1982: 487) . But what about the -revolutionary‖ force of epigenesis? The sense Diderot had that he and others were -on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences,‖ but not a revolution that was subsumed under an autonomous science of biology? As I have tried to describe, this -great revolution‖ which did not happen at least as envisaged by Diderot, 
